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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

JOHN P. DORITY,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
JEANNE D. DORITY,

Case No. 17376
Defendant- Respondent.
---0000000---

NATURE OF CASE

This is a divorce action in which the plaintiff husband
appeals from the property distribution and alimony award entered by the
trial jud p;e.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Following a day-long trial before the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, a divorce was granted to the parties.

The husband was awarded

in excess of one-half of the parties' accumulated property, but was
ordered to pay a modest fixed-term alimony award to the wife.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant-respondent Jeanne D. Dority respectfully requests
that this Court affirm in its entirety the Decree fashioned by the trial
court and, additionally, order an award to her of such sum as will
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reasonably compensate her for the attorney's fees incurred in the
defense of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant-respondent (hereinafter

"~.1rs.

Dority") deems it

necessary to present a concise statement of the facts of this case since
the statement presented by plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter
"~.1r.

Dority") fails to rei1ect accurately all of the relevant facts and

circumstances at issue.
At the time the parties were married--almost a quarter century
ago in 1956--each had obtained essentially all of their formal
education.

(Tr. at 5 and 61; R. at 202 and 258.)

~1r.

Dority was a

young patent attorney with I. B. ~.1. earning approximately $12, 000 per
year.

(Tr. at 6; R. at 203.)

During their marriage, the parties raised

four children, all of whom had attained their majority prior to the
trial.

(Tr. at 8; R. at 205.)
The parties moved four times., keeping pace with Mr. Dority's

employment, eventually locating in September of 1966, in Devon,
Pennsylvania, where they purchased a home on Schoolhouse Lane.
9-10; R. at 206-07.)

(Tr. at

This residence was occupied by the parties and

their children until August of 1972, when
children moved from the home.

~1rs.

Dority and the four

(Tr. at 12; R. at 209.)

The parties have

been separated since that time.
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A separate maintenance action was commenced in Pennsylvania
in 1972 (Tr. at 12-13; R. at 239-40) and, in June of 1977, Mr. Dority
instituted divorce proceedings in Pennsylvania (Tr. at 15; R. at 212).
In the fall of 1978, Mr. Dority was transferred to Utah and,
in 1979, he voluntarily elected to institute a Utah divorce action, even
though the Pennsylvania proceedings were still pending at that time.
(R. 2-4 and Tr. at 44; R. at 241.)

Thereafter,

~.1r.

Dority filed a

petition in the Pennsylvania divorce proceeding seeking to discontinue
that action based upon his residence here in Utah.
At the time of the trial, Mr. Dority was 55 years of age and
employed as a senior patent attorney with the Sperry Corporation.
(Tr. at 20; R. at 247.)
(_!Q..)

He was earning in excess of $51, 000 per year.

On the other hand,

~1rs.

Dority was 52 years of age and suffering

from ir:ipaired eyesight as a result of a cataract condition that had
earlier necessitated surgery.

(Tr. at 80; R. at 277.)

She was employed

at Drexel University in Pennsylvania, receiving a gross annual income of
$16,824.

(Exhibit D-9, received R. at 274, reproduced infra at A-3.)
At the time of trial, the parties' former residence on

Schoolhouse Lane in Devon, Pennsylvania, had an appraised value of
$95, 000 (Deposition of Laurence Scott) and was subject to a mortgage in
the amount of $16,000 (Tr. at 32; R. at 229), with an additional $17,000
owed to Mrs. Dority's family for the repayment of funds advanced for its
maintenance and improvement (Tr. at 73-74; R. at 270-71).

Accordingly,

3
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the Pennsylvania property had a net value of $62, 000.

In addition,

Mr. Dority had purchased a $100,000 house here in Salt Lake County,
which was subject to a $51,000 mortgage (Tr. at 33; R. at 230) and an
obligation in the amount of $30, 500, incurred to obtain the downpayment.
Accordingly, the Salt Lake property had a net value of $18, 500.

The

parties also owned in excess of $112, 000 in securities, which Mr. Dority
had placed in his own name.
reproduced infra at A-1.)

(See, Exhibit D-8, received R. at 278,

Mr. Dority further had a vested interest in a

retirement fund with a value at trial in excess of $85,000.
R. at 232.)

(Tr. at 35;

While Mr. Dority claims that most of the stock owned at the

time of trial had been acquired after the parties' separation in 1972,
it was clear from his testimony that he had sold a substantial amount of
stock acquired prior to the separation in order to reaquire stock
following the separation.

(Tr. at 37-39; R. at 234-36.)

In dividing the assets acquired during the tenure of the
parties' 25-year

marria~e,

the trial court awarded approximately

$160, 000 in assets to Mr. Dority, while awarding only approximately
$120,000 of assets to Mrs. Dority.

(See Schedule "A", infra at A-2.)

During the marriage, Mr. Dority progressed from a young
attorney to a highly successful corporate patent attorney, with a
consequent more than quadrupling of his annual income.

Mrs. Dority, on

the other hand, gave up her job as a newspaper reporter and remained at
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home, rearing the parties' family and tending to their household needs.
(Tr. at 62; R. at 259.)
Notwithstanding that he received some $40, 000 more than his
wife and well over half of the combined assets, Mr. Dority appeals from
the trial court's property distribution, challenging that it is unfair
to him.

Notwithstanding that the trial court ordered h:ir.J to pay only

$500 per month in alimony, and only for a three-year period,

~.1r.

Dority

appeals from the trial court's alimony award, cla:ir.Jing that it is
unreasonable.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED DECREE

FASHIONED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PRESUMED PROPER AND SHOULD
NOT BE MODIFIED ABSENT A CLEAR SHOWING BY THE APPELLANT
THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION OR WAS
MISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW.
This Court has on innumerable occasions held that, while a
divorce action is equitable in nature, the ruling of the trial judge is
favored with a presumption of propriety and accuracy.

It is only in

those few instances in which the appellant can clearly demonstrate a
manifest abuse of discretion or misapplication of law that the decree
fashioned by the trial judge will be disturbed.

Such a proposition is

logically grounded upon the advantaged position of the trial court, who
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has observed the witnesses, heard the testir:iony. and become acquainted
at least to a lir.iited degree with the parties, their problems, and their
properties.
In a tacit recognition of the fact that the Findings of Fact
entered by Judge Sawaya are supported by sufficient credible evidence,
Mr. Dority relies upon the equitable nature of divorce proceedings in
his invitation to this Court to revamp the original decree.

A sir:iilar

invitation was refused in Eastr:ian v. Eastman, 558 P. 2d 514 CUtah 1976),
with the observation that:
We have many times stated that even
though proceedings in divorce cases are
equitable, in which this Court may review
the evidence, due to the prerogatives and
advantaged position of the trial court,
we give considerable deference to his
findings and judgment; and we do not
disturb ther:i unless the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary, or he has
abused his discretion, or has misapplied
principles of law.
558 P.2d at 515-16 (footnote citations omitted).

It is, therefore,

incumbent upon the appellant in a divorce case to demonstrate some clear
abuse of discretion or misapplication of law before this Court will act
to revise any aspect of the original decree.
This Court has long held that its inherent power to supplant
the trial judge's discretion is to be exercised only judiciously and
infrequently.

For example, in Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79,

296 P.2d 977 0956), it was held that:
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The more recent pronouncements of this
court, and the policy to which we adhere,
are to the effect that the trial judge
has considerable latitude of discretion
in such matters and that his judgment
should not be changed lightly, and in
fact, not at all, unless it works such a
manifest injustice or inequity as to
indicate a clear abuse of discretion.
296 P.2d at 981 (footnote omitted).
Since the plan of distribution and decree fashioned by the
trial judge will be modified only if the result of a clearly
demonstrated abuse of discretion or of a manifest misapplication of
relevant law, the burden is upon the party dissatisfied with the trial
court's decision to demonstrate such error.

This traditional

proposition was recognized in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah
1977), in which the principles applicable to this appeal were concisely
summarized by this Court:
The trial court, in a divorce action,
has considerable latitude of discretion
in adjusting financial
and • property
interests.
A party appealing therefrom
has ·the burden to prove there was a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the
law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings; or such
a serious inequity has resulted as to
manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
565 P. 2d at 410 (footnote citation omitted).

Essentially identical

statements of this principle can be found in many other Utah cases,
including Baker v. Baker, 551 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1976); Hansen v. Hansen,
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537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975); and Mitchell v. t.Htchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah
1974).
Under the standards of review traditionally applied by this
Court, the property distribution and alimony award entered in this case
are presumed valid and will be affirmed unless Mr. Dority has
demonstrated that Judge Sawaya has so clearly abused his discretion as
to result in substantial prejudice or has misapplied the relevant law of
this state to such a degree that the decree entered is manifestly unfair
and inequitable.

Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah 1977); Spangler

v. Spangler, 561 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1977); Pearson v. Pearson,
561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977); Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah
197 4); Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429 P. 2d 35 (1967); t.1ichelsen
v.

~1ichelsen,

14 Utah 2d 328, 383 P. 2d 932 ( 1963).

POINT 11.

APPELLANT HAS ENTIRELY FAILED TO MEET

HIS BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING SOME ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR
MISAPPLICATION OF LAW; THEREFORE, THE ORIGINAL DECREE SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
A.

The trial court appropriately refused to be bound by

Pennsylvania law.
Although appellant in his brief (App. Br. at 11-12) recognizes
the great discretion accorded the trial court in domestic matters, he
then myopically ignores this principle, arguing that the trial court

8
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erroneously refused to be bound by certain arbitrary provisions of
Pennsylvania law.

Mr. Dority voluntarily filed this divorce action here

in Utah and, thereafter, voluntarily sought the dismissal of the
Pennsylvania action, which he had earlier filed.

Notwithstanding his

clearly manifest election to obtain his divorce in Utah, Mr. Dority now
seeks to require the trial court to apply selectively portions of the
domestic relations law of Pennsylvania, which
believes to favor his position.

~.Ir.

Dority apparently

The unreasonableness is apparent of

Mr. Dority's demand that his wife (who was still a Pennsylvania resident
at the time of the trial of this action) come to Utah to defend the
divorce proceeding but then be faced with the application of certain
isolated provisions of Pennsylvania law.
~.1r.

Dority is a Utah resident.

He voluntarily filed this

divorce action here in Utah.

The overwhelming bulk of the parties'

assets were located in Utah.

Mr. Dority abandoned the divorce action

that he had once commenced in Pennsylvania.

Yet, he now argues that the

trial court should have applied Pennsylvania law.
The trial court, of course, had the statutory jurisdiction to
divide fully the property of the parties.

Section 30-3-5, Utah Code

Annotated (1953 as amended), broadly states:
When a decree of divorce is made,
the court may make such orders in
relation
to
the • . •
property
and
parties • • • as may be equitable ••
§30-3-5(1), Utah Code Annotated ( 1953 as amended).

Accordingly, once

9
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the jurisdictional prerequisites were met, the trial court had broad
power to divide the property of the parties in an equitable manner.
The bulk of the parties' property was located here in Utah;
accordingly, it was appropriate that this property, at least, be divided
pursuant to Utah law.

In In re marriage of Ramsey, 526 P.2d 319

(Ct. App. Colo. 1974), the trial court's refusal to distribute property
pursuant to Colorado law was reversed:
of
for
dissolution
proceeding
in
rem
~.1oreover,
where, as here, a
petitioner
. • . has
possession
of
property located in Colorado • . . the
court acquires control of the property by
virtue of its jurisdiction over petitioner, and the court thereby obtains
jurisdiction to determine the appropriate
disposition of that property.
An
marriage

action
is
a

526 P. 2d 320 (citations omitted).

Likewise in this case, the trial

court properly distributed the property of these parties in accordance
with Utah law.
Moreover, in Smestad v. Smestad, 94 Idaho 181, 484 P.2d 730
(1971), the Idaho Supreme Court articulated a similar proposition, but
extended its scope to include property of the parties located in a
foreign jurisdiction.

The wife contended on appeal that the trial court

had erred in distributing property located outside the state of Idaho.
The court held, however, that so long as personal jurisdiction had been
obtained, it was appropriate for the trial court to apply its law in
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order to distribute property located outside of the state of Idaho.
(484 P.2d at 733).

~.1r.

Dority does not dispute that the trial court had

obtained personal jurisdiction over both parties.
In Noble v. Noble, 26 Ariz. App. 89, 546 P.2d 358 (1976), this
concept was applied even to property located in a foreign nation.

It

was argued on appeal that the trial court had erred both in attempting
to effect a distribution of the foreign property and in basing the
distribution upon the provisions of its local state law.

These

contentions were rejected on appeal:
We agree that the courts of this
state
do
not
have
jurisdiction
to
determine title to property in another
state or foreign country. However, we do
not view the trial court's determination
of the interest of the parties in the
Denmark property as determining the title
to that property.
Rather, we view the
trial court's determination to simply be,
as between the parties before the court,
what interest they held in the foreign
jurisdiction property.
This the trial
court may properly do.
546 P.2d at 361.

In the present case, it was appropriate both for the

trial court to divide and distribute the relatively small portion of the
parties' property that was not located within the state of Utah and for
the trial court to have divided that property under the applicable
provisions of Utah law.
Appellant does not contend that the overall distribution of
the parties' property effected by the trial court was inherently unjust

11
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or inequitable; rather,

r.1r.

Dority simply complains that the trial court

did not find itself to be bound by certain provisions of Pennsylvania
law.
~1rs.

The trial court's award of the residence in Pennsylvania to
Dority makes a great deal of common

sense--~1r.

Dority effectively

abandoned that house two years ago when he moved to Utah and knowingly
allowed it to go to the point of foreclosure, thus requiring
to take the property back and care for it.
R. at 245 and 269-70.)

~.1rs.

Dority

(Tr. at 48 and 72-73;

Additionally, !.1r. Dority has chosen to reside

here in Utah, while Mrs. Dority remains in Pennsylvania.

Under such

circumstances, it was logical for the trial court to award the Utah
property to

~.1r.

Dority, and the Pennsylvania property to :.1rs. Dority.

Since in the overall distribution of the property,

r.1r.

Dority

was awarded well over half of the parties' assets, he has no legitimate
complaint with the distribution fashioned by the trial court.

B.

The total property distribution effected by the trial

court is entirely appropriate.
The assets of the parties, as reflected by their testimony,
are summarized in defendant's Exhibit 8, which was received into
evidence by the trial court.

(Tr. at 81; R. at 278.)

reproduced in the Appendix to this brief.
~1r.

This exhibit is

(Infra at A-1.)

At trial,

Dority testified that the Sperry Corporation stock was worth $93,805

12
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(Tr. at 34; R. at 231) and the trial court interlineated that amount;
therefore, the assets actually total $286, 316.
As noted earlier, the trial court awarded $162,119.50 of these
assets to

r.1r.

Dority, well in excess of one-half.

The distribution of

the assets effected by the trial court's Decree is summarized as
Schedule "A" in the Appendix.

(Infra at A-2.)

Examination of the distribution effected by the trial court
makes clear that Mr. Dority's complaints about the property distribution
are without merit.

The trial court managed to give

~.1r.

Dority well in

excess of one-half of the parties' assets while at the same time
implementing the logical result of leaving each party with one of their
two homes.

Mr. Dority claims that the trial court should be directed to

credit him with "the equivalent value of the separate property appellant
brought into the marriage which was traced to the acquisition of the
Devon real property".

(App. Br. at 14.)

~1r.

Dority did not document

this disputed claim at trial, yet, this is precisely what the trial
court has done in distributing more than one-half of the total assets to
Mr. Dority.
The trial court has certainly not abused its discretion in
fashioning the property distribution.

As this Court recently observed

in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980):
There is no fixed formula upon which
to determine a division of properties, it
is the prerogative of the court to make
whatever disposition of property as it
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deems fair, equitable, and necessary for
the
protection and
welfare
of
the
parties.
In the division of marital
property,
the trial judge has wide
discretion, and his findings will not be
disturbed unless the record indicates an
abuse thereof.
615 P. 2d at 1222 (footnote citations omitted).

The trial court cannot

be said, in this case, to have abused its "wide discretion" by making
the logical distribution of one house to each party, while at the same
time ensuring that

~1r.

Dority receive in excess of one-half of the

parties• total properties.
Mr. Dority's contentions on appeal are nothing more than an
attempt to augment the already generous property distribution fashioned
by the trial court.

He, in effect, complains that he was awarded only

something in excess of one-half of the parties' total assets.

However,

property distributions much more favorable to the wife have been
routinely upheld by this Court.

For example, in Tremayne v. Tremayne,

116 Utah 483, 211 P. 2d 452 (1949), the trial court awarded approximately
four-fifths of the parties• property to the wife.

In upholding that

distribution, this Court noted that the distribution of property
is in the discretion of the trial court
which will not be disturbed unless the
court abuses its discretion.
The facts
of each divorce case are different and
each must be determined on what is
equitable to the parties under the facts
of the case ••
Through schooling [the husband's J
earning capacity has been substantially
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increased during the marriage and [the
wife's] earning capacity has not been
proportionately increased during that
time. • • •
How far either one would
have gone without the other is largely a
matter of conjecture.
The facts and
circumstances amply justified the court
in dividing the property as it did even
if treated as a division of the property
but does not require that she be awarded
a larger portion thereof.
The court
acted well within its discretion and we
will not disturb its decision thereon.
211 P.2d at 454 (numerous citations omitted).
In his brief, r.lr. Dority argues that this Court's decision in
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980), supports his
contention that his alleged contribution, subsequently traced to the
Pennsylvania real property, should have been reimbursed to him by the
trial court.

An examination of the facts of that case reveals,

however, that any reliance upon it by Mr. Dority is misplaced.

In

Jesperson, the marriage was only of five years' duration and the parties
were 68 and 73 years of age at the time of their marriage.

The husband

had brought "virtually no assets" to the marriage, while the wife
brought in excess of $40, 000 in assets, more than half of which were in
cash.

(610 P.2d at 327.)

tiloreover, this Court emphasized that neither

of the parties, being of advanced age, were gainfully employed; thus, no
assets were produced during the marriage.

<..!.!!.·)

This Court held that

the trial court had not abused its discretion by fashioning a property

15
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distribution which, in effect, reimbursed the wife for the assets which
she had brought to the marriage.
In the present case, the marriage occurred 25 years ago
between vigourous and productive young adults;

~.1r.

Dority's salary has

quadrupled to over $50,000 per year; and assets well in excess of
one-quarter million dollars have been amassed during the marriage.

By

no stretch of the imagination can this Court's holding in Jes person be
said to stand for the proposition that Mr. Dority is entitled to a
dollar-for-dollar reimbursement of the assets that he (allegedly)
brought to this marriage.
While

~.1r.

Dority asserts that his testimony that he brought

some $26, 000 in government bonds to the marriage was "unrefuted"
(App. Br. at 6), Hrs. Dority testified that he never told her about this
money; that to her knowledge he brought no such assets with him to the
marriage; and that immediately after their marriage he had to borrow
$500, previously given to her by her father, in order to repair the
roof.

(Tr. at 62-63; R. at 259-60.)

Accordingly, the trial court may

also have found Mr. Dority's belated claim to these assets to have been
inherently incredible.
Throughout his argument that the property distribution should
be modified, Mr. Dority myopically isolates the Pennsylvania real
property, failing to recognize that the overall distribution is entirely
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fair and cannot be said to constitute an abuse of discretion by the
trial court.

POINT III.

THE THREE-YEAR ALIMONY AWARD ENTERED BY

THE TRIAL COURT IS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD NOT BE MODIFIED.
The trial court ordered that

~.1r.

Dority pay $18,000 in

alimony, at the rate of $500 per month for three years.

On appeal,

Mr. Dority contends that this award "should be vacated."

Again,

Mr. Dority suggests that since he once lived in Pennsylvania,
Pennsylvania law should be applied with regard to alimony.

He admits,

however, that the Pennsylvania law in effect at the time of the trial
permitted the award of alimony.

(App. Br. at 17-18.)

Although it was

he who chose to bring this action in Utah, Mr. Dority now contends that
the trial court erred by not applying Pennsylvania law to its alimony
award.

Such a contention is without merit and, not surprisingly,

!.1r. Dority fails to cite a single case or authority in support of it.
The trial court's modest alimony award to !\1rs. Dority is
appropriate and in full compliance with the decisions of this Court,
which have consistently held that an ex wife is entitled to an award of
alimony based upon her health, the duration of her marriage, the
standard of living to which she has become accustomed during that
marriage, and the former husband's demonstrated income potential.

17
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These factors were recently recognized by this Court in Gramme
v. Gramme, 587 P. 2d 144 (Utah 1978), which Mr. Dority cites in his brief
(App. Br. at 20).

In the present case, Mrs. Dority has experienced

continuing difficulties with her eyesight and is earning less than
~.1oreover,

one-quarter of r.ir. Dority's income.

this is a long-term

marriage, during which Mrs. Dority has raised the parties' family and
maintained their household, while
career.

~.ir.

Dority has prospered in his

Under the factors enumerated by this Court in Gramme, the

short-term alimony ordered by the trial court cannot be said to
constitute an abuse of discretion.
l\lr. Dority's contention (App. Br. at 17) that the three-year
alimony award entered by the trial court is double what he has been
paying to

~.lrs.

Dority under the temporary Pennsylvania support order is

misleading because it fails to recognize that in Pennsylvania she was
receiving not only $250 in alimony but an additional $400 in support for
a total of $650 per month.

Equally misleading is Mr. Dority's assertion

(App. Br. at 18) that he had paid "over $32, 000 by the time of trial" in
temporary support to his wife.

In so stating, he wholly overlooks that

during the corresponding period he had earned well over $300, 000.
(Tr. at 46-47; R. at 243-44.)

Clearly this is not--as ?.ir. Dority

contends--an "enormous windfall".

(App. Br. at 18.)

Nor is alimony of

$500 per month for a three-year period a "very generous award".
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C_!i·)

The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that Mrs. Dority's
monthly living expenses total $2, 272.69.

These expenses were itemized

in defendant's Exhibit 10, which was received into evidence by the trial
court.

(Tr. at 79; R. at 276.)

the Appendix.

(Infra at A-4.)

A copy of this exhibit is reproduced in
Accordingly,

~.Ir.

Dority's protestations

(App. Br. at 18) that his former wife "had a monthly expendable income
of $1, 332. 02" is unavailing and amounts to nothing more than a tacit
admission of her need for some degree of continued support.
In light of the long duration of the marriage, Mr. Dority's
demonstrated substantial income potential, and the standard of living to
which his wife had grown accustomed during the marriage, the trial
court's award of alimony in the amount of $500 per month for a limited
three-year period cannot be said to be an abuse of discretion.

These

very factors have long been held by this Court to be of significance in
determining the wife's entitlement to alimony.

For example, in Wilson

v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 (1956), the marriage had lasted 15
years and the principal issue on appeal was the appropriate amount of
alimony to be awarded.

This Court held that in determining alimony,

[t]he
court's
responsibility
is
to
endeavor to provide a just and equitable
adjustment of [the parties'] economic
resources
so that
the
parties
can
reconstruct their lives on a happy and
useful basis.
In doing so it is
necessary for the court to consider
• • • an
appraisal
of
all
of
the
attendant facts and circumstances:
the
duration of the marriage; the ages of the
19
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parties;
their
social
positions
and
standards
of
living;
their
health;
considerations relative to children; the
money and property they possess and how
it was acquired; and their capabilities
and training and their present and
potential incomes.
296 P.2d at 979-80 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

Application of

these factors in the present case renders inescapable the conclusion
that the trial court acted well within its sound discretion.
The policy that the alimony award be sufficient to enable the
wife to maintain the social status and standard of living to which she
has become accustomed during her marriage has been emphasized in other
recent decisions of this Court.

In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409

(Utah 1977), it was held in connection with a twenty-year marriage
that:
[Tl he most important function of alimony
is to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard Of
living she enjoyed during marriage, and
to prevent the wife from becoming a
public charge.
565 P.2d at 411 (emphasis added).

And in Frank v. Frank, 585 P.2d 453

(Utah 1978), in response to the remonstrances of a physician to the
trial court's alimony award, this Court observed:
How the defendant, or any one on his
behalf, could even suggest that a wife
who had devoted 21 years to her marriage
and reared a family should be turned out
to subsist on her own is as discordant to
our sense of justice as it was to the
trial judge.
585 P.2d at 455.

This observation would appear equally applicable to

the present case.
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During his marriage, Mr. Dority's salary quadrupled from just
over $12,000 to the more than $50,000 he presently earns as a senior
corporate patent attorney.

During their marriage, the Dorities amassed

assets in excess of one-quarter million dollars.

Mr. Dority now

contends that the trial court's award of alimony of $500 per month for
three years was an abuse of discretion; any such contention is utterly
without merit.

POINT IV.

RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER

ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THIS APPEAL.

Due to Mr. Dority's dissatisfaction with Judge Sawaya's
rulings, Mrs. Dority has been burdened with the costs of this appeal.
This Court has frequently held that, in such circumstances, an award is
appropriate to cover the added costs necessitated by the dissatisfied
party's appeal.

For example, in Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104

(Utah 1977), the husband, disenchanted with the trial judge's award,
appealed with the usual contention that the property distribution was
unfair and inequitable.

The original decree was affirmed and the case

remanded to the trial court for the assessment and award of attorney's
fees incurred by the wife as a result of the appeal:
Inasmuch as the plaintiff has been
put to the necessity of defending this
appeal, which we have found to be without merit, it is our opinion that she is

21
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justified in her request for a further
award of attorney's fees in addition to
the modest amount of $200 allowed her in
the trial court.
569 P. 2d at 1106.

To the same effect are Fletcher v. Fletcher,

615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980); and Baker v. Baker, 551 P.2d 1263 (Utah
1976).

In this case, an award of attorney's fees on appeal is

particularly appropriate, since the trial court did not award fees to
either party at the trial, thus requiring each to bear their own costs.
The only aspect of Judge Sawaya's decree with which
does not quibble is the granting of the divorce itself.

~.1r.

Dority

As a result of

this appeal, Mrs. Dority has incurred substantial additional expense.
It is, therefore, appropriate that she be reinbursed for those

additional expenses necessitated by this groundless appeal.

CONCLUSION
In divorce cases, this Court has invariably held that the
decision of the trial judge is to be respected unless it clearly appears
that he has abused his discretion or manifestly misapplied relevant law.
This standard of review appropriately grants deference to the advantaged
position of the trial judge, who has seen the parties, listened to their
testimony, and had a personal opportunity to perceive their problems and
circumstances.

Nowhere in his brief does appellant isolate a single

instance in which Judge Sawaya's findings are not supported by the
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evidence; rather, Mr. Dority states and restates his dissatisfaction
with the trial judge's ruling--such is neither an appropriate nor a
sufficent ground for reversal or modification.
M.r. Dority was transferred to Utah in 1978 and in 1979 he
filed the present action here in Utah.

He also voluntarily petitioned

to dismiss a Pennsylvania divorce action that he had earlier filed.
Only a single asset of the parties remains in Pennsylvania.
~.lr.

Yet

Dority now complains that the trial court refused to consider itself

bound by certain arbitrary provisions of Pennsylvania's domestic
relations law, which M.r. Dority apparently deems favorable to his
position.

The trial court correctly refused to consider itself bound by

Pennsylvania law.
Even if, through an application of Pennsylvania law,
Mr. Dority is entitled to a one-half interest in the Pennsylvania real
property, the overall property distribution fashioned by the trial court
is sufficiently generous to him that modification is not required.
Dealing with assets totaling approximately $286, 000, the trial court
awarded $162, 000 to Mr. Dority and only $124, 000 to respondent.

The

overall property distribution is, therefore, entirely fair and equitable
and well within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Modification

is unnecessary and would be inappropriate.

In the dissolution of this marriage, which had lasted for a
quarter century, the trial court ordered that M.r. Dority pay alimony for

23
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only three years at the rate of $500 per month.

In light of

Mrs. Dority's impaired vision, the fact that her income is a mere
quarter of Mr. Dority's, and the expenses inherent in the standard of
living enjoyed by Mrs. Dority during the marriage, such a modest alimony
award is certainly not an abuse of discretion.
Although Mr. Dority points to the fact that he has paid a
substantial sum to his wife as temporary alimony during their
separation, he ignores the fact that during the same period he earned
ten times that amount.

The short-tero alimony award entered by the

court is entirely reasonable and must be affirmed.
Due to this appeal, which results solely froo
disenchantment with Judge Sawaya's sound decisions,
incurred unnecessary but significant expense.

~1r.

~.1rs.

Dority's
Dority has

Under the decisions of

this Court, it is appropriate that she be awarded such additonal sum as
will reasonably compensate her for the attorney's fees incurred in the
defense of this appeal.
The decree and property distribution entered by Judge Sawaya
reflect careful, wise and judicious consideration of the parties and
their properties.

Those orders, carefully fashioned by the trial judge

who has had an opportunity to observe and come to know the parties,
should not be disturbed absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion or
manifest injustice.

No such showing has been made in this case and

Judge Sawaya's decision should be affirmed in its entirety.
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DEFENDANTS.

.

EXHIBIT-··
·:~2

ASSETS

:?Cl - ~ L1 tJ '7

Equity

Asset

Value

464 Schoolhouse Lane
Devon, PA

$95,000(Deposition of
Lawrence S. Scott)
(16 ,000) (Mortgage)
(17,000) (Gladys Doseff
$ to restore house) $ 62,000.00

3621 Oakview Drive

100,000(Appraisal by
Jerry Webber)
(51,000) (Mortgage Walker
Bank)
49,000.00

Asbestos Ltd.

1,102 shares at 3 3/5

4,000.00

Sperry Corp.

1,511 shares at 55 3/8

~~00 ~
83,588.99

IBM

220 shares at 65 5/8

14,436.00

Loan at Merrill Lynch
secured by stocks

(30,500.00)

Devon House Fund

2,000.00

TIAA-CREF

6,567.00

Sperry Vested Retirement
(12/31/79)

85,008.00

Furniture (parties each have comparable values)
Automobiles (parties each have comparable values)
Total Assets Less Liabilities

Equal division of assets would be -

$276,099.00

$138,049.50
138,049.50
$276 099 • 00
I
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SCHEDULE "A"
Distribution per Decree
Husband
464 Schoolhouse Lane
Devon, PA
(Less mtg. & $17,000 loan
to wife's mother)

Wife

$ 62,000.00

3621 Oakview Drive

$ 49,000.00

Asbestos Ltd.

4,000.00

Sperry Corp.
850 to wife at 55 3/8
844 to husband at 55 3/8

46,736.50

IBM Stock
100 to wife at 65 5/8
120 to husband at 65 5/8

7,875.00

Loan at Merrill Lynch
(secured by stocks)

47,068.75

6,562.50
(30,500.00)

Devon House Fund

2,000.00

TIAA-CREF (wife's retirement fund)

6,567.00

Sperry Vested Retirement (12/31/79)

85,008.00
$162.119.50

$124.198.25

Total

$286,317.00
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A-2

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT _

CURRENT INCOME OF PARTIES
Plaintiff - John P. Dority
Annual Income
1976

$ 46,739.00

1977

48,378.00

1978 (distortion for moving
expense)

63,692.00

1979

59,466.00
$

Monthly Salary from Sperry
(exclusive of dividends)

4, 179. 60
1,243.00

Less State and Federal withholding

132. 30

Less Social Security ($1,587.00 per
year divided by 12)
Net Monthly Expendable Income

$

2,804.30

$

1,402.00

Defendant - Jeanne Dority
Annual Income
1979

$ 16,824.00

Monthly Income

650. 00

Current Support

30 0. 00

Rental Income
(Schoolhouse Lane - gross rent $650 less
payments, taxes, and maintenance $350)
Total

$

334.00

Less State, Federal and City taxes

85. 98

Less Social Security
Net Monthly Expendable Income
Without Support From Plaintiff
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2,352.00

$

1,932.02

$

1,332.02

DEFENDANT'S
.:·. EXHIBIT :

MONTHLY EXPENSES OF JEANNE DORITY
Item

Amount

Rent
(currently $472, will go up $40
10/1/80)

$

513.00

Real Property Insurance

5.40

Maintenance
Food and Household Supplies

20.00
785.58*

Telephone

40.00

Laundry and Dry Cleaning

10.00

Clothing

80.00

Medical

55.00

Dental

15.00

Health and Accident Insurance
Blue Cross

24.50

Blue Shield

21. 33

Major Medical

4.27

Faculty Club Dues

7.50

Retirement Plan TIAA-CREF

63.11

School

50.00

Incidental

30.00

Transportation

60.00

Automobile Expense

116. 00
60.00

Other Expenses
Additional Income Tax
(Assuming alimony payment $1,200 per
month at 26%)
TOTAL

312.00

$2,272.69

*All four sons have their home address with defendant.
Doug, home, full-time college-Drexel
Tom, home, work, full-time college Fall 1980
Ben, away college, home 3 1/2 months summer
Jim, away college, intends all this year away
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this

J_

day of

~ 1981,

I placed with

"The Runner Service" two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to
be delivered to David M.• Swope and John K. Mangum, lnELSEN

&

SENIOR,

1100 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111.
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